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In the Supre1ne Court 
of the State of Utah 
VIRGIL REDMOND, 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PETTY MOTOR COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Respondent and Defendant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7562 
The respondent is not satisfied with the statement 
of facts contained in the appellant's brief and desires 
to set out herein a statement of the facts more accurately 
and in more detail. 
This cause went to trial upon the second amended 
complaint of the appellant (R 15) in which were alleged 
three causes of action, only the first two of which are 
involved herein. The first cause of action alleges in 
substance that appellant entered into a conditional 
sales contract with the respondent at Salt Lake City 
for the purchase of 'a 1946 Stake Body Ford truck 
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for a stated price and that, as a part of the trans-
action, it was orally agreed by respondent's agent that 
respondent would obtain insurance covering loss by 
collision or upset under a type of policy commonly 
known as a $100.00 deductible policy. The premium 
for such insurance was added to the purchase price 
for the truck and included in the total amount due 
under the conditional sales contract after an allowance 
had been made for a truck turned in by the appellant 
at the time of' the purchase. 
This transaction occurred on March 28, 1949 and 
on April "6, 1949, near Boise, Idaho, the truck was 
overturned, causing damage of approximately $665.00. 
Appellant alleged that the defendant "wholly neglected" 
to obtain collision insurance as agreed and that this 
fact was concealed from him for a period of 60 days, 
during which time he was without the use of his 
truck, and in addition, he was required to pay all the 
damage occasioned by the accident inasmuch as no 
insurance policy had been obtained. 
Appellant, in his first cause of' action, prayed judg-
ment for the amount of the insurance premium, for 
the cost of repair of the truck, and for loss of use of 
the truck for the 60 day period during which it was 
claimed the truck sat idle without being repaired be-
cause of the concealment by the respondent of the alleged 
fact that no policy of insurance had been obtained. 
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By its answer, the respondent denied that it 
had failed to obtain an insurance policy, and upon 
trial there was introduced as Defendant's Exhibit 4 a 
policy of insurance covering the truck under a $100.00 
deductible plan. Appellant never attempted to assail 
the validity of the insurance policy. No evidence was 
produced indicating that the policy was invalid or 
void during the 75 day period following the original 
insurance carrier had been denied by the carrier. This 
was done through the testimony of the appellant and 
the witness Imhoff. No agent or authorized employee 
of the American Aviation & General Insurance Com-
pany was ever called to testify concerning the policy. 
Imhoff was admittedly not an agent of the insurance 
company; rather, he was an independent adjuster who 
adjusts claims for the company in question and for 
other companies (R 223). He was allowed to recite, 
over timely objection, (R 224, 225) that he had been 
informed that the company rejected the claim filed 
transaction. To the contrary, apellant introduced by 
his Exhibit D a Notice of Cancellation from the insur-
ance carrier which indicates that the insurance carrier 
cancelled the policy on June 20, 1949, 75 days after 
its effective date of issue, from which it may be inferen-
tially stated, upon the authorities hereinafter set forth, 
that the policy was in force from the date shown upon 
it until such time as it was cancelled. Appellant at-
tempted to escape the force of the insurance policy 
by introducing evidence that a claim presented to the 
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by Redmond because the company "believed there was 
no policy of insurance, any valid policy of insurance 
at the time of this loss." Evidence was also intro-
duced by the plaintiff of conversations between the 
plaintiff, the respondent's agent, Mr. Petty, and Mr. 
Vander, an insurance broker in Salt Lake City. This 
evidence revealed that there had been a conflict be-
tween Petty and Vander as to the date of the appli-
cation which was made by respondent for the insur-
ance. Mr. Petty testified that he saw the application 
in Vander's office and it bore a date stamp indicating 
it was received by Vander on April 5th (R 216), 
which was prior to the accident. This evidence is 
uncontradicted. Neither V,ander, nor any representa-
tive of his office, was called to testify, nor was the 
application produced, and it is fair to presume, from 
this, that the missing evidence would have corrobo-
rated Mr. Petty's testimony. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the respondent 
moved the court for a directed verdict on the ground, 
among others, that respondent, by its oral contract, 
had agreed to obtain an insurance policy and that 
such con tract had been fullfilled by reason of the 
existence of the insurance policy, Exhibit 4. This 
policy shows that the truck was covered from the 
date of the conditional sales contract, to wit, March 
28, 1949. The respondent urged upon its motion that it 
was not required, under the terms of its oral contract, 
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to guarantee that ·any claim brought under the terms 
of the policy would be paid by the insurance company. 
Since a policy was obtained and it was good upon its 
face we argued to the court that the appellant's first 
cause of action could not be successfully maintained 
until and unless appellant had shown that this insur-
ance policy was invalid either because of fraud, mis-
representation, or some other matter which would 
give the insurance company a valid reason for dis-
honoring its policy. The court denied the motion, 
remarking: ""ve have gone this far in this matter" 
and ruling that the matter would be submitted to 
the jury, but the court clearly indicated its belief that 
the appellant could not maintain the action without 
a showing that the insurance policy in evidence was 
invalid, stating: 
''I am going to submit it to the jury but 
I will consider, take under advisement, the ques-
tion of whether I may have to undo whatever 
they do because I think you should first, as a 
part of this action, adjudicate that you do not 
have a good policy." (R 264, 265) 
It was on this ground, among others, that the court, 
1 :: after verdict, granted respondent's motion for judg-
!. ment notwithstanding the verdict. 
As to the second cause of action, appellant, in 
his complaint, alleged that respondent had made a 
statement to the appellant that the truck would be 
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warranted to be in good condition of repair for a 
period of 90 days and that the warranty was breached 
because a "wrist wrench" (Exhibit C) was in the 
pan of the truck at the time of the purchase and the 
wrench "caused the truck to be and become out of 
repair and the motor to become defective" (R 17). 
This cause of action was destroyed by appellant's 
own testimony upon cross-examination, (R 123) when 
he admitted that there was neither a written warranty 
nor an oral warranty for any period of time what-
ever, -and that he had purchased the truck upon an 
''as is'' basis as revealed by the purchase order, 
Exhibit A. Over objection by respondent, evidence 
was allowed of some sort of trade useage or custom 
by which an implied warranty was claimed to have 
controlled the transaction. Such implied warranty was 
never pleaded -and was not within the issues framed 
in the pleadings, and further was in contradiction to 
the terms of the contract agreed upon by the parties 
as evidenced by the purchase order, Exhibit A, and 
the contract, Exhibit B. These latter factors, in addi-
tion to plaintiff's admissions (R 123), were the factors 
recognized by the court when it granted the defendant's 
motion for directed verdict as to this second cause 
of action. 
The appellant, by his brief, indicates that the only 
considerations to be decided upon this appeal are the 
questions of whether or not the court committed error 
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in granting respondent's motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict as to the first cause of action, 
and in directing a verdict for the respondent on the 
appellant's second cause of action. Respondent's ,argu-
ment will be devoted to a consideration of the follow-
ing points: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED 
UPON BY RESPONDENT 
(A) THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT UPON THE APPEL-
LANT'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
(B) THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT ON 
APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING RE-
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT UPON THE APPELLANT'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Respondent's Exhibit 4, the insurance policy in 
question, was introduced in evidence and received by 
the court without objection by the appellant. Examina-
tion reveals it to be the ordinary automobile insurance 
policy covering the truck in question from March 28, 
1949. The policy was prepared some time in the first 
part of April, 1949 and was countersigned, as required 
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by Utah law, on April 12, 1949. The evidence is with. 
out dispute that it is a common practice in the insurance 
business for policies to be back-dated to cover a 
vehicle from the date of a conditional sales contract 
for its purchase (R 236). It is also without dispute 
in the evidence that this policy was ordered in the 
ordinary course of business by the respondent com. 
pany and that the policy was back-dated in accordance 
with the ordinary course of business among automo-
bile dealers, finance companies, and insurance com-
panies, Exhibit A (R 235, 236). 
It is significant that although the appellant was 
confronted with the policy of insurance at an early 
stage in the proceedings on this cause, no effort was 
ever made to call for testimony any agent or employee 
of the insurance company which wrote the policy or 
of the agency which accepted the risk at the time 
the respondent ordered the insurance. The appellant 
produced no evidence of any kind to challenge the 
validity of the insurance policy, but concentrated his 
attack upon the proposition that the respondent should 
be held liable because a claim had been presented on 
an insurance policy and had been denied by the insur· 
ance company because it believed there was no valid 
policy in existence at the time of the loss, which belief 
was based upon a dispute as to the time the appli· 
cation for the insurance was filed. No other reason 
for the den~al of the claim appears in the record. 
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There is no evidence in the record of fraud or mis-
representation and this is for the very good reason 
that there was no fraud or misrepresentation. The 
appellant made no attempt to enforce the provisions 
of the insurance policy although he knew of its existence. 
He had no correspondence with the insurance com-
pany or with its local representatives. The policy stood 
from the date of its issuance until June 20, 1949 with-
out being challenged by the insurance company (R 
118 -120). The insurance company took no action in 
the weeks intervening between the proof of loss and 
the notice of cancellation to invalidate the policy or 
to exercise any option it might have had to void the 
policy, which option is claimed by appellant to have 
existed, in law. 
By the terms of the or·al agreement between the 
appellant and the respondent company, respondent com-
pany agreed to obtain insurance and when the insur-
ance policy in evidence was obtained, its contract was 
fullfilled. This agreement could not be extended by any 
stretch of the imagination to include ·an agreement by 
the respondent to guarantee that any loss or claim 
under the policy would be honored by the insurance 
company. Respondent could do no more than obtain 
a policy and hold it in trust for the appellant, as is 
the practice with a· conditional vendor, and exert such 
effort and such pressure as it might have by reason 
of prior dealings with the local insurance agent to 
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see that the assured under the policy received fair treat-
ment. This respondent attempted to do repeatedly. 
Mr. Petty, having applied for the insur·ance, and believ-
ing the insurance to be in force, took appellant to 
the insurance adjuster as soon as appellant returned 
to Salt Lake City on or about April 11th or 12th, 
1949 (R 240). He accompanied appellant to various 
repair shops to arrange for repairs (R 238). H·e made 
appointments to get repairs made and used his influ-
ence to make the appointments earlier than ordinarily 
would have been the case. A clear indication of the 
lack of good faith of appellant, to which further ref-
erence will be made, is found in the fact that appellant 
failed to keep such an appointment at the Diamond T 
Truck Company, although this was a long time before 
any dispute had arisen about the insurance policy (R 
189, 190). 
The very nature of the claimed cause of ·action 
set forth by the appellant as his first cause of action 
can be no more than this : Respondent agreed to 
obtain an insurance policy; appellant claims the 
policy was never obtained and the contract was thus 
violated; respondent produced the insurance policy 
to show its contract was not violated. Clearly, then, 
unless the appellant can show that the ·policy thus 
obtained was ·a mere scrap of paper, the appellant 
must fail. As pointed out by Appleman, in "Insurance 
Law & Practice", Volume 3, Sec. 1811, et seq., an 
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insurance policy, good and valid upon its face, is a 
good, valid and subsisting contract between the insur-
ance company and the assured until such time as 
one of the following things occurs: 
1. A court of competent jurisdiction adjudicates 
that the policy is void. 
2. The insurance company terminates the con-
tract in accordance with the provisions of the policy 
relating to termination or cancellation. 
3. The insured terminates the contract by follow-
ing the procedures set forth in the policy for terminat-
ing or cancelling the policy. 
None of these alternative measures had occurred 
prior to the institution of this law suit by appellant. 
If either of the latter two alternatives had been com-
menced prior to the institution of the law suit, neither 
could affect the rig.hts of any person under the policy 
as it existed prior to such occurrence. The law in this 
connection is well stated in 29 American Jurisprudence, 
Insurance, Sec. 281, page 261, wherein it is stated: 
''The cancellation of an insurance policy 
does not affect the rights which have already 
accrued under the policy in favor of the insured 
or of a third person, and consequently, notice 
of the insurer's previous election to terminate 
the policy, given the insured after a loss has 
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occurred, is manifestly insufficient to avoid lia-
bility under the policy for such loss." 
This doctrine was referred to f,avorably by the 
Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Schubach v. 
American Surety Company of New York, 1929, 73 
Utah 332, 273 Pac. 974, at page 354 of the Utah Reports. 
It is extremely doubtful that a court would have 
relieved the insurance company of its obligation under 
this policy even if an action had been commenced 
against the company on the policy, because the com-
pany, by its lack of action in the period from early 
April until June 15, 1949, indicated its belief that 
the policy was in existence and was in full force and 
effect. This is further emphasized by the fact that 
the notice of cancellation sent by the company to the 
appellant, Exhibit D, follows the provisions of the 
policy relating to cancellation by giving notice t.o 
the insured that the policy would be cancelled five 
days following the date of the notice, namely, on June 
20, 1949. Such a notice of cancellation by the insur-
ance company is said to be an ,admission that the 
policy is in force as of the date of the notice of 
cancellation. Appleman "Insurance Law and Practice", 
Volume 12, Sec. 7124. Middleton vs. North American 
Protective Association, 1931, 260 Ill. Appellate Courts 288. 
Whether or not the insurance company would have 
been relieved of its policy had an action been instituted 
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against it cannot be determined in this law suit for 
the reason that the question was not explored by the 
appellant and no evidence ·was brought to bear by hin1 
in his attack upon this policy. Appellant claims that 
the jury passed on the questions herein involved ad-
versely to the respondent and the instructions of the 
court presented the matters to the jury and were based 
upon competent evidence. A mere cursory reading of 
this record reveals the fallacy of this statement. All 
of the evidence in the record rela:ting to the insurance 
policy may be summarized as follows: That the con-
tract between the parties hereto was made March 28, 
1949; that the insurance was applied for by employees 
of the respondent company on March 30, 1949; that 
in the next few days a request was received from the 
insurance agency for two items of additional informa-
tion about the appellant, namely, his age and previous 
driving record; that the records of the insurance ag·ency 
showed an application received by that office and date 
stamped in the ordinary course of business on April 5, 
1949; that an accident occurred to the truck April 6, 
1949, which fact was made known to the respondent on 
April 7 or 8, 1949; that appellant returned to Salt 
Lake City on April 11 or 12, 1949, with the truck; 
that the necessary proofs of loss and other notices to 
the insurance company were presented personally to the 
adjuster, Imhoff, on or about April 14, 1949; that 
two weeks later a conversation was had between Mr. 
Petty, representing the respondent, and Mr. Redmond, 
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for himself, and a Mr. Vander, the insurance agent, at 
which time a dispute arose between Petty and Vander 
as to the date of the application received by Vander's 
office; that the claim was later denied by the company 
because of its belief that no valid policy existed at 
the time of the loss. 
It is submitted that none of the foregoing evidence 
even bears remotely on the question of whether or 
not the respondent obtained a valid insurance policy. 
The policy was in evidence. It was good and valid 
upon its face. No evidence was brought into court 
showing it was not valid and not good upon its face, 
and no evidence was produced from any competent 
person who could speak for the insurance company that 
the insurance company did not consider the policy in 
full force and effect until after the institution of this 
action. Obviously such evidence would have been easy 
for the appellant to obtain had it been in existence, 
because such evidence would have aided the insurance 
company in getting "off the risk". It was the appel~ 
lant who had the burden of successfully assailing the 
insurance policy. Equally obvious is the fact that 
the respondent could not have obtained such evidence 
~ven if it had been available because the insurance com~ 
pany, at the time of trial, had taken the position that 
its policy was of no force and effect from the date of 
June 20, 1949 and forward, and it would be extremely 
difficult for the respondent to find willing testimony 
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contradicting a decision which had been made by the 
responsible company. 
It was because of this lack of competent evidence 
impugning the validity of the policy that the trial 
court correctly ruled that the appellant had the burden 
of showing that the insurance policy was invalid before 
it could successfully maintain its first cause of action. 
Of course, respondent, after its motion for directed 
verdict was denied before submission to the jury, was 
required to submit such requests for instructions as 
would tend to mitigate the damages which might be 
returned by the jury in a situation such as this, but 
it did so without abandoning its position that the entire 
matter was not a question for the jury. 
In addition to all of the foregoing, however, there 
is another factor which, it seems to us, is conclusive 
of this phase of this appeal. The question of whether 
or not this contract was breached by the respondent is 
a question primarily of law. The question of the 
validity of the insurance policy is primarily a question 
of law. Particularly is this true when, as here, there 
is a complete lack of competent evidence relating to 
the insurance policy and only a hodgepodge of incon-
clusive evidence about matters leading up to the exist-
ence of the policy. It is the familiar rule on appeal 
in cases of this kind that the trial court's action will 
not be disturbed unless there is a substantial showing 
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by the appellant of error or abuse of discretion. It 
is submitted that the appellant in his brief, has done 
little more than quote testimony favorable to himself 
and favorable to his construction of the problem pre-
s-ented, and tha.t a fair examination of the entire rec-
ord reveals that the trial court had no alternative but 
to remove the legal question of the validity of a docu-
ment from jury consideration. It is difficult to see 
how the trial court could have done otherwis-e, particu-
larly in view of the fact that the insurance company, 
whose policy was attempted to be destroyed by its own 
insured, was never present in court, either as a party 
or by competent agents or employees as witnesses. 
Our research has not revealed a case in this juris-
diction or ·elsewhere which could be said to be in point 
on the problem presented on this appeal. Most of the 
cases which have arisen in this branch of insurance law 
have been actions between an insured and a broker 
or other insurance agent for failure to obtain or pro-
cure insurance for the benefit of the insured. Such 
recoveries as have been allowed have usually been 
upon the proposition that the broker failed to exercise 
that degree of professional skill or judgment required 
of him when he assumed to act for the insured. The 
facts which were produced in thes-e cases to show a 
breach of the contract have usually revealed that the 
broker pl,aced the insurance in an insolvent insurance 
company or in a foreign insurance company not au-
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thorized to do business in the state where the trans-
action occurred, so that when the insured attempted 
to enforce the provisions of his policy he found no 
process agent or other person on whom service of 
process could be had, and thus his policy was little 
more than a scrap of paper. We have found no case 
where a person has agreed to obtain insurance for an 
insured and has obtained the insurance and has later 
been held responsible to the insured becaus-e of the 
refusal of the insurance company to honor a claim 
under its policy. To require the broker to stand in the 
shoes of the insurance company so far as the insured 
is concerned is to make the broker an insurer, which 
should not be done unless the broker, by his own con-
duct, or by the lack of due care or failure to take 
reasonable steps to obtain insurance, has visited such 
liability upon his own shoulders. We believe the rule 
applicable to brokers is equally applicable to the situa~ 
tion which presents itself here. The only ,exception to 
that statement may arise in the event a statutory pro~ 
vision creates special duties and requirements for per-
sons acting as brokers, with which contingency we are 
not concerned in this case. 
The general rule is summarized in 29 American 
Juris prudence, Insurance, Sec. 107, page 129, as fol-
lows: The broker or agent "must exercise such reason-
able skill and ordinary diligence as may fairly be ex-
pected from a person in his situation in doing what is 
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necessary to effect an insurance policy, in seeing that 
it effectually covers the property to be insured in select-
ing the insurer and ascertaining that it is of good credit 
and standing and in obtaining as good terms as are 
reasonably possible.'' Section 108 of the S'ame volume 
states the general rule to be that "one who undertakes 
to procure insurance on the property of another and, 
unjustifiably and through his fault or neglect, fails to 
do so will be held liable for any damage resulting there-
from.'' In this connection it is interesting, in view of 
the amounts claimed by appel1ant, to note the measure of 
damages applied under the general rule just quoted. The 
measure of damages, according to American Jurisprud-
ence, is "the amount that would have been due under 
the insurance policy provided it had been obtained." 
From the foregoing rules it is apparent that no 
showing was made by the appellant which entitles him 
to recover from this respondent for the alleged failure 
to obtain the insurance policy in question. There was 
never a showing of neglect or fault on the part of the 
respondent. Indeed, it is difficult to see what the re-
spondent could have done that it did not do. Appellant 
confines himself to a showing simply of a dispute which 
arose between an adjuster, (not employed by the in-
surance company involved) and the appellant and re-
spondent, which culminated in information being re-
ceived by the appellant from the insurance adjuster to 
the effect that the claim under the insurance policy had 
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been denied. The appellant could furnish no additional 
evidence that the insurance company was ever requested 
to honor its policy or ever requested to explain in 
detail its apparent refusal to pay the claim as pre-
sented to it through the adjuster, Imhoff. 
We submit that the insurance company, on the 
basis of this record, could not successfully defend an 
action against it on this policy, particularly when the 
records of its own general agent show the application 
was commenced on March 30 and completed on April 
5, both dates being before the loss occurred. This policy 
was a good and valid policy and, by obtaining it, re-
spondent fully and completely performed its contract 
with appellant. 
THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT ON APPEL-
LANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The second cause of action set forth in appellant's 
second amended complaint (R 15) alleged an agreement 
by which the respondent warranted the condition of the 
instant truck for a 90 day period. This alleged warranty 
was denied by the respondent's answer. When the ap-
pellant on cross-examination (R 123) admitted that he 
had never been given a written warranty or an oral 
warranty of any kind, and admitted further that he had 
purchased the truck on an ''as is'' basis, this cause of 
action was effectively destroyed. However, appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
thereafter produced a string of witnesses ~attempting 
to show some sort of implied warranty by trade usage. 
This evidence was received by the court over respon-
dent's repeated and timely objections. The objections 
went to the proposition, first, that such issues were not 
framed by the pleadings and had never been claimed by 
the appellant until that moment of the trial, and, sec-
ondly, that the written contracts and purchase order 
documents which had been received in evidence effec-
tively eliminated the possibility of a warranty, and 
appellant, by his own testimony, had admitted that the 
purchase had been made by the use of these documents 
and that no agreement outside the documents had been 
made. Even after the admission of such evidence of a 
trade useage, it was quite clear that there was no sub-
stantial evidence upon which this cause of action could 
have been submitted to the jury. Respondent cited to 
the court below, upon the occasion of the argument and 
presentment of its motion for directed verdict on the 
second cause of action, the case of Landes & Co., vs. 
Fallows, et al, 81 Utah 432, 19 Pac. 2nd 389 (1933), 
which case involved a similar contract to the contract 
at bar, and which case was decided adversely to the posi-
tion now asserted by the appellant. 
The appellant's testimony concerning the alleged 
warranty was in direct conflict to the claim set forth 
in his complaint, and in addition to this fact, the ap-
pellant admitted that the truck had been examined by 
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him and the engine had sounded all right to him at the 
time of the purchase. He admitted he had been told 
that the truck was not new and he knew he was buying 
a used vehicle. Although the truck was fully loaded, 
no difficulty was encountered in its operation for many 
hundreds of miles. 
It is also significant that, when this lawsuit was 
instituted, appellant's only claim of breach of warranty. 
was grounded upon the claim that the wrist wrench in 
. the pan of the truck caused the defective condition of 
the engine. No other claim was ever made by appellant 
until the day of trial, when he apparently abandoned 
the wrist wrench, after his ''expert'' witnesses, Lake 
(R 162) and Moulton (R 174) both admitted the wrist 
wrench could not have caused the trouble. Then, ap-
pellant began to rely on a claim that the engine was 
worn out at the time of purchase, and even this evidence 
was sharply contradicted. This latter claim could only 
be "afterthought" and was entitled to little or no con-
sideration by the trial court, in view of all the circum-
stances. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents the rather unusual situation of 
a purchaser of a truck turning in an old truck as down 
payment on a newer truck and entering upon a written 
contract -providing for regular m·onthly payments and, 
even though not one cent has been paid by the pur-
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chaser under this arrangement, and even though the 
seller did everything within its power to assist the 
purchaser when misfortune occurred and the truck was 
wrecked, the purchaser nevertheless brings action 
against the seller for breach of the contract to obtain 
insurance. Further than that, the purchaser appears' 
not to be content to seek merely what he would have 
had had the insurance company honored his claim under 
his policy, but instead seeks to recover the sum of 
$417.00 insurance premium, which sum he has never 
paid and seeks to recover for loss of use ·of the 
truck for a 60 day ·period when, by his own testimony, 
it would not have taken more than two weeks to re-
pair the truck, (R 121) particularly had he kept the 
appointments and complied with the arrangements that 
had been made by Mr. Petty of the respondent company 
to see to it that the repairs were accomplished within 
the fastest possible time. If the appellant, who is the 
purchaser here, was desirous simply of being restored 
to the position in which he would have been had no dif-
ficulty arisen in connection with this policy, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that he would have combined 
his efforts with those of the respondent company for the 
purpose of re·pairing his truck and getting it back on 
the road and in service in the fastest possible time. We 
submit, however, that this has not been his intention at 
any time. The record is without contradiction that he 
has willfully withheld permission for respondent to 
e~amine the truck or to inspect it (R 239), all as pro-
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vided by the terms of the contract. He failed to keep 
the appointments made for him by the respondent and 
did absolutely nothing toward remedying the diffi-
culties with which he was faced, and finally brought 
suit against the respondent prior to the time when 
the insurance policy was cancelled and at a time when 
respondent was still attempting to help the appellant. 
These factors, which bear upon the good faith of 
the appellant, colored his entire case and, when con. 
sidered with the fact that the insurance policy, Ex-
hibit 4, stands unchallenged and when coupled further 
with the fact that the appellant's exorbitant claim of 
a breach of warranty crumbled by his own testimony 
on cross-examination, there can be no doubt that the 
action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the 
respondent on the second cause of action and revers-
ing the judgment and verdict of the jury on the first 
cause of action, was emminently proper and amply 
supported by the record, and should be sustained by 
this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDGAR C. JENSEN, 
JOHN H. SNOW, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Defendant. 
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